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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3705
___________
YONGZHAO LIU,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A95 872 608)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Charles M. Honeyman
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 2, 2011
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 13, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Yongzhao Liu seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
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(“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. 1 For the reasons that
follow, we will deny the petition for review.
Liu is citizen of China who arrived in the United States in 2002. Shortly
thereafter, he filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He alleged that his wife
underwent two forced abortions and that he left China because he feared that he would be
sterilized for violating the country’s one-child policy. In 2004, an Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) denied the application, concluding that Liu had not met his burden of proof. The
BIA affirmed without opinion, and we denied Liu’s petition for review. Liu v. Att’y
Gen., C.A. No. 06-1958, 236 F. App’x 744 (3d Cir. June 11, 2007).
In August 2007, Liu filed a motion to reopen, claiming that his attorney provided
ineffective assistance of counsel and asserting that country conditions in China had
changed. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that it was untimely and that Liu had
not satisfied the requirements stated in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA
1988), for presenting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Liu filed a petition for
review, which we denied in part and granted in part. Liu v. Att’y Gen., C.A. No. 074798, 296 F. Appx. 253 (3d Cir. Oct. 10, 2008). In particular, we held that the motion to
reopen was untimely, that Liu was not entitled to equitable tolling, and that he did not
make any effort to comply with any of the procedural requirements stated in Lozada. But
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Throughout the immigration proceedings, the petitioner’s name has also
appeared as “Yong Zhao,” “Youngzhao,” and “Yougzhao.”
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because there was no indication that the BIA had considered whether Liu satisfied the
conditions for reopening based on changed country conditions, we remanded the matter
to the BIA. Liu, 296 F. Appx. 253, at 256. On remand, the Board held that Liu’s
evidence was insufficient to establish a change in country conditions so as to create an
exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen. Liu did not file a petition
for review of the Board’s decision.
Liu filed a second motion to reopen in January 2010, seeking to submit a
“successive asylum application . . . because of changed country conditions and changed
personal circumstances.” This time Liu alleged that he feared persecution based on his
participation in pro-democracy political groups in the United States, such as the China
Democracy Party (“CDP”) and the Federation for a Democratic Party (“FDC”). He also
claimed that Chinese authorities visited his wife and warned her that Liu had to stop his
political activities. Liu further asserted that “[c]onditions in China have changed greatly
regarding the ability to propagate any ideas dissenting from the official one-party line on
the Internet or traditional media since [he] was denied asylum.” To support the allegedly
changed country conditions, Liu submitted State Department reports, news articles
describing CDP members who had been arrested upon their return to China, and an
affidavit from a friend in China surmising that Liu will be persecuted if he returns
because of the government’s increased suppression of political dissent.
On August 18, 2010, the BIA denied the motion to reopen, holding that it was
time- and number-barred and that Liu did not qualify for the exception from those
3

requirements based on changed circumstances arising in China. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The Board concluded that Liu’s involvement in pro-democracy
organizations constituted a change in personal circumstances and not changed country
conditions, that he failed to establish that the Chinese government was aware of his
political activities in the United States, and that he had not demonstrated a relevant
change in country conditions based on China’s treatment of returnees who participated in
pro-democracy activities. Liu filed a timely petition for review of the BIA’s decision.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 242
[8 U.S.C. § 1252]. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.
Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006). Under this standard, we may reverse
the BIA’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Sevoian v.
Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002). An alien generally may file only one motion
to reopen, and must file the motion with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on
which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The
time and number requirements do not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed
country conditions,” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)], or “changed
circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and
was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous
hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The term “previous hearing” in
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) refers to the proceedings before the IJ. Filja, 447 F.3d at 252.
Liu does not dispute that the BIA correctly determined that the motion to reopen
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was untimely and number-barred. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In addition, the BIA
correctly held that Liu’s alleged membership in pro-democracy political groups in the
United States is a change in his personal circumstance, not a change in country conditions
that would support reopening. See Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 150-51 (3d Cir.
2009); see also Liu v. Holder, 560 F.3d 485, 492 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that
“membership and participation in the CDP and its activities in the United States . . .
demonstrated a change in [Petitioner’s] personal circumstances but did not demonstrate
changed country conditions in China.”). Liu maintains, however, that the BIA “abused
its discretion because it did not explicitly consider all of the evidence of changed country
conditions.” We disagree.
The BIA is required to “actually consider the evidence and argument that a party
presents.” Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Abdulai v.
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir.2001)). Indeed, “the BIA abuses its discretion if it
fails completely to address evidence of changed country circumstances offered by a
petitioner.” Id. at 268 (quoting Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)). Here,
the Board specifically identified the evidence that Liu submitted in support of his claim,
including evidence of changed country conditions that “materially bears on his claim.”
Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 2005). In particular, the BIA noted
Liu’s submission of “various county reports that address the government’s crackdown on
political opponents in China,” the statement from Liu’s friend describing “more and more
severe” government suppression, and other “evidence of county conditions in China,”
5

which included news articles about the arrests of two CDP members. After considering
this evidence, the Board held that Liu had not demonstrated a relevant change in country
conditions in China. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the BIA adequately
considered the materials submitted by Liu in support of his claim of changed
circumstances.
We also agree that Liu’s evidence did not establish changed country conditions in
China sufficient to warrant reopening. Liu’s changed country conditions argument relied
primarily on excerpts from State Department Country Reports, which described
harassment, detention, and imprisonment of those perceived to be a threat to the Chinese
government. Those Reports, however, do not demonstrate a material change in the
treatment of members of pro-democracy political groups since the 2004 proceedings
before the IJ. For instance, the 2007 Report states that individuals “who participate in
high-profile pro-democracy activities in the United States still run the risk of arrest and
imprisonment should they return to China.” (emphasis added). Notably, the 2004 State
Department Profile of Asylum Claims, which was submitted in connection with Liu’s
initial asylum proceedings, indicates that political dissenters generally, and CDP
members specifically, faced repression by the Chinese government. Although Liu quotes
portions of the more recent State Department reports that refer to “increased” harassment,
detention, and censorship, those alleged changes pertain generally to the treatment of the
press and those perceived as threats to government authority, not to members of prodemocracy groups specifically.
6

Liu also relied on affidavits from his nephew and a friend which suggested that
Liu would face persecution in China based on his political activism. Liu’s nephew
claimed that Chinese authorities “asked [Liu’s wife] to inform [him] to quit the FDC . . .
immediately” and “threatened . . . that if [Liu] returned, he must report to the . . . [p]olice
[s]tation . . . and accept investigation and punishment.” Liu’s friend claimed that because
“in recent years the Chinese government’s suppression on democratic movements
became more and more severe,” Liu “will definitely be persecuted” if he returns to China.
These affidavits provide, at most, anecdotal evidence of China’s long-standing policy of
prohibiting political dissent. Accordingly, we agree that the affidavits do not sufficiently
demonstrate a change in country conditions. 2
In sum, because the BIA properly concluded that Liu did not satisfy the exception
to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen based changed country conditions, we
will deny the petition for review.
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Because Liu failed to establish that reopening was warranted, we reject any
assertion that he is entitled to file a successive asylum application pursuant to INA
§ 208(a)(2)(D) [8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D)] or to pursue relief under the CAT. Liu, 555
F.3d at 150 (explaining that “8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) allows successive asylum
applications only within the 90-day reopening period for orders denying asylum unless
the alien can show changed country conditions on the required accompanying motion to
reopen.”).
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